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Abstract
Recently, there have been calls to apply evolutionary game the-
ory to neuroscience. Ours, to the best of our knowledge, is the first
application of dynamical evolutionary games to decision making in
neuroscience. Firing neurons are the players in the game. The strat-
egy of the players is their firing rate. Neurons with equal firing rates
define a population. The neurons (players) do not know the rules of
the game, they do not know what the reward is, they are not required
to be rational and they do not even know they are playing the game.
The interactions among the neurons is inhibitory. The theory con-
firms experimental data about decision making in vision (to move the
eyes or not to a known target) in that: (i) A parameter of the game
model (variance in the size of the neuron populations that participate
in the game) determines how many distinct populations of firing neu-
rons participate in the decision to move the eye to a target; (ii) if the
populations of firing neurons are localized, then the solution of the
game dictates how many loci in the brain participate in the decision
to move the eye; (iii) the theory clarifies the difference between ulti-
mate (evolutionary) factors and their effect on proximate (immediate)
factors that influence decision making in the brain; (iv) as expected,
the theory predicts that quick decisions are associated with more errors
and slow decision are associated with fewer errors—however, the theory
ties these factors to the evolution of brain decision making processes.
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1 Introduction
Recently, game theory has been applied to decision making in neuroscience.
One of the fundamental questions (that is much overlooked; see Glimcher,
2002) is the relationship between ultimate (evolutionary) and proximate
(immediate) causation of behavior. Since the 1970s, evolutionary game the-
ory has advanced the view that Darwinian evolution does not lead to fitness
optimization (where optimization is defined as maximizing some objective
function with respect to constraints). Instead, evolution yields solutions of
games (where the solution is usually suboptimal). This lead to a profound
change in the view of the outcome of Darwinian evolution—the latter, it
was argued, does not necessarily maximize fitness. In applications of opti-
mal control theory to ecology, there is a single organism on which natural
selection acts to maximize its fitness. When there is more than one or-
ganism with its own objective function, then we have a game (see Brown
and Vincent, 1987; Cohen, 1987). Here, we introduce a specific approach
to decision making theory in neuroscience: dynamical evolutionary games.
Decision making is mechanistic and in the context of a game, in which neu-
rons are players. We also make clear distinctions between proximate and
ultimate factors that influence neuronal responses to stimuli and eventually
to decision making.
Evolutionary game theory involves players, rules, strategies and rewards.
Each player attempts to maximize its reward by adopting a strategy value,
according to the rules, and in response to other players’ strategy values. In
evolution by natural selection, players are individuals (proteins, cells, whole
organisms). The rules are inheritance, phenotypic variation with respect to
(inherited) adaptive traits, and natural selection. The strategies are values
of phenotypic traits, such as anatomical features and acuity of perception.
The rewards are fitness. The latter defines the survival of phenotypic traits
through changes in their frequency and density in the population of firing
neurons.
With respect to neuroscience, we make the following definitions. The players
are single neurons. Their strategy is their firing rate. The reward is fitness;
namely, the firing rate that results in maximizing survival of the strategy
Cohen and Cohen · Game theory and decision making 3
in the face of interactions with all other neurons with similar maximizing
processes. Possible adaptive mechanisms that lead to maximizing fitness
are acuity of perception and speed and accuracy of response to stimuli. The
solution to a game depends on what one wishes to define as a solution.
Thus, in games one talks about a solution concept, which from hereon we
call solution. Solutions require that the outcome of the game obeys some
definition of stability. One such concept is the Nash equilibrium (Nash,
1954), in which none of the players can gain by changing their strategy
unilaterally.
Our goal is to apply a specific method borrowed from evolutionary game
theory (Vincent and Brown, 2005) to answer the following questions: (i)
What is a reasonable choice of a strategy? (ii) What defines interactions
among neurons? (iii) What is an appropriate definition of a solution? (iv)
How many distinct populations of neurons does the solution dictate? (v)
What is the size of these populations? (vi) How may the solution of the
game relate to decisions to respond to a stimulus?
We define a population as a collection of neurons that displays a distinct
strategy value (firing rate). If strategies (different firing rates) are localized,
then (iv) answers the question of how many distinct population centers in
the brain emerge from the solution of the game. There are fundamental
differences between economic and behavioral games on the one hand and
evolutionary games on the other. In evolutionary games, the players do
not know the rules, they do not know what the rewards are, they are not
required to be rational and they do not even know that they are playing a
game. As in some other games, evolutionary games do not allow cooperation
(e.g., negotiation). Consequently, evolutionary games are mechanistic—no
self-awareness is involved.
Maynard-Smith and Price (1973) and later Maynard-Smith (1982) proposed
the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) as a solution to evolu-
tionary games. Because evolutionary games obey Darwinian rules (Darwin,
1859), the outcome of evolution by natural selection is not necessarily the
best adapted organisms. It is the group (community) of phenotypes with a
set of trait values such that other phenotypes with different values (mutants)
cannot invade the community and survive. In the game-theory vernacular,
this community is called the coalition (not to be confused with the outcome
of negotiations). The stable state of strategy values and population densities
in which mutants cannot invade and coexist with the coalition is called ESS.
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Two questions then emerge: what is the set of strategy values that make up
the ESS and how many different strategy values coexist at ESS? Since 1973,
a whole field of evolutionary games has emerged (Fudenburg and Levine,
1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Samuelson, 2002; Nowak and Sigmund,
2004).
Here, we introduce the so-called smooth dynamical evolutionary games (as
opposed to matrix games). In particular, we follow the approach developed
by Vincent and Brown (2005). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first attempt to apply this specific game theoretic approach to decision mak-
ing through interacting neuron populations. Consequently, our approach is
mostly theoretical. Yet, we will address some qualitative predictions of the
theory and cite published results that support or refute these predictions.
We assume that most readers are not familiar with evolutionary game the-
ory. Therefore, our exposition of the subject is at a tutorial level. Refer to
Vincent and Brown (2005) for a complete treatment of the subject. Recent
applications of evolutionary games include cancer research (Gatenby and
Vincent, 2003) and Darwin finches (Vincent and Vincent, 2009).
The manuscript is organized thus: In section 2 we introduce the concepts
upon which the remaining of the manuscript depends. We then define ESS
and temporary ESS which we dub TESS (section 2.1), outline how one finds
ESS (section 2.2) and discuss the important subject of strategy dynamics—
how strategies change over time (section 2.3). Finally, we discuss the mean-
ing of winners and losers in the context of evolutionary games (section 2.4).
In section 3, we show how the game, with its dependence on parameter val-
ues, determines how many distinct populations of firing neurons survive the
game. In particular, in section 3.1 we introduce a mathematical model that
we rely upon. The model is used to fit (qualitatively) experimental results of
one and two strategies to the model (section 3.3). We close with discussion
(section 4), where we outline the potential contribution and limitations of
the theory to neuroscience and potential future work.
2 Evolutionary game theory in the context of fir-
ing neuron populations
Here, we define and explain the concept of ESS and a related concept which
we call Temporary Evolutionary Stable Strategies (TESS). We then outline
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a method to calculate them. In the following sections we will show how
this concept may be used to describe a decision making process based on
identifiable populations of firing neurons. Dynamical evolutionary games as
formulated here were introduced by Vincent et al. (1993) and are explained
in more detail in Vincent and Brown (2005). Some rigorous aspects of the
theory may be found in Vincent et al. (1996) and Cohen et al. (2000). Games
with multiple strategies are discussed in Brown et al. (2007). An alternative
relevant approach to evolutionary games was introduced by Cohen (2003a,b,
2005, 2009a)
Here we introduce some fundamental definitions:
Strategy value (ui(t)) A value on the real line, at time t, that controls
the magnitude of some response of collection i of neurons to a stimulus.
We shall use ui as the firing rate of a neuron. This firing rate affects the
neuron’s and other neurons’ firing rates through excitation and inhibition.
The magnitude of the excitation and inhibition is mediated through some
function of ui. In this manuscript we discuss inhibition only.
Virtual Strategy (v) The set (function) of all possible strategy values.
Population (xi(t)) The number of collection i of firing neurons that share
the same strategy value (firing rate) at time t.
These definitions imply that if we have n populations of neurons participat-
ing in a single decision, then we have
Populations (x(t)) Defined as
x(t) := [x1(t), . . . , xn(t)] .
Corresponding to these populations, there are n strategy values (on a con-
tinuum of a single phenotypic trait which we call strategy); thus we have
Strategy values (u(t)) Defined as
u(t) := [u1(t), . . . , un(t)] .
For each xi(t) there corresponds a strategy ui(t). To simplify the notation,
and when unambiguous, we will write ui instead of ui(t) and so on for the
other definitions. If ui are localized, then we recognize distinct population
Cohen and Cohen · Game theory and decision making 6
centers of neurons of the brain. Note that a population is defined by its
function, as opposed to by the location of its member neurons. A functional
population is then defined by the value members of the population (neu-
rons) share with respect to strategy values (firing rates). A strategy value
determines the function of neurons.
To implement dynamical games through differential equations, we make the
following assumptions: (i) The populations are large enough so that the ad-
dition or subtraction of a single neuron to a population may be considered
relatively small. (ii) If the strategies are localized, the response of an indi-
vidual neuron is independent of its location within the local population. (iii)
The statistical moments of the response of the population of firing neurons
(e.g., mean, variance) characterize the population trajectory. Assumption
(i) implies that changes in population sizes can be approximated by smooth
functions. Assumption (ii) implies that we can ignore the location of in-
dividual neurons in a specific area in the brain. Assumption (iii) implies
that we may ignore stochastic effects. Essentially, these assumptions hold
when populations are large and the locations they occupy are small. The
functions we use must have at least second derivatives.
2.1 Definition of ESS
Throughout, we discuss populations of neurons. The ideas can be applied
to single firing neurons. In such a case, the firing rate of a single neuron is
its strategy and it is equivalent to a population of neurons.
To simplify the discussion, we assume a single strategy and any number of
populations, n. Multiple strategies are discussed in Brown et al. (2007).
Again, a population is defined by a distinct value of a strategy. Membership
in a population is not necessarily fixed. For each response to a stimulus,
different neurons may be members of different populations. However, during
a single response to a single stimulus, membership remains unchanged. If the
firing rate of a neuron is genetically determined (i.e., the neuron will always
fire at the same rate), then membership in a population is permanent. Some
neurons might belong to a population permanently and others temporarily.
Let xi(t) be the number of neurons firing with rate ui(t) at time t. We write
the rate of change of xi generically thus:
x′i = xiHi(u, x), i = 1, . . . , n (1)
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where primes denote derivatives with respect to time. In evolutionary ecol-
ogy, Hi is called instantaneous fitness function. When Hi > 0 the population
grows, when Hi < 0 it declines, and when Hi = 0 it is at equilibrium, which
may or may not be stable.
In what follows, we assume that there exists an equilibrium solution (i.e.,
Hi = 0 for all i), denoted by ¯x = [x¯1 , . . ., x¯n] where x¯i ≥ 0. If some of
the x¯i > 0, we say that the system is in neuronal equilibrium. Otherwise,
it is not. If small perturbations to ¯x result in the system returning arbi-
trarily close to this equilibrium, then we say that the neuronal equilibrium
is (asymptotically) stable. For a system in stable neuronal equilibrium, we
can order x¯i from largest to smallest so that some of the x¯i (or none at all)
will equal zero. Suppose that 0 < r ≤ n elements of ¯x are positive and n −
r are zero. This allows us to define ESS thus:
ESS The vector ¯xr is an ESS for the stable neuronal equilibrium ¯x if for
any m > r and any u, ¯x is a stable neuronal equilibrium.
Consequently, any population with firing rate u that is different from those
we find for ESS cannot coexist when the system is at ESS. The definition also
implies that we have to establish the right number of positive populations,
r, that participate in ESS. The ESS solution determines the values of u
for each population, how many distinct populations must participate in the
process and the size of each population. If these populations are localized,
then r is the number of centers in the brain that must participate in the
game for the coalition to be an ESS. The question is how we establish the
values of ¯x and u that guarantee that we found the ESS. We address this
question in the next section. It turns out that in addition to ESS, we will
be interested in how the system approaches arbitrarily close to ESS from
some initial conditions. We call this period of approach the Temporary ESS
(TESS). The TESS will provide a clue as to the rules for decision making
based on x and u.
2.2 Finding ESS
To provide a recipe for finding ESS (and TESS), we need to first define the
so-called G-function. Recall that u defines a set of n points on the strategy
curve. Each of these points corresponds to a particular x. We define
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G-function (G) A function G (v, u, x) such that when v = ui, we obtain
G (ui, u, x) = Hi (u, x) (2)
for all t, where Hi is defined in equation (1) (see Vincent et al., 1996).
Note that ui are specific strategy values. However, as we shall see, ui change
in time. The regulating mechanism (inhibition) drives all values of u to
points where each value of x is at its maximum with respect to all of u—
this in essence is what makes the formulation a game. Consequently, we
need to introduce a virtual variable, v, that will assist in determining these
maximums. Thus we write the G-function as G(v, u, x). Only when v = ui
do we achieve the equality in equation (2). A further motivation for using
v is provided below. We present the following theorem without a proof (see
Vincent et al., 1996).
Theorem (ESS Maximum Principle) Let G(v, u, x) be a G-function for
system (1). If ¯ur := [u¯1 , . . ., u¯r] is an ESS for the neuron populations at
equilibrium, ¯x, then G(v, ¯u,¯x) must take its maximum value as a function
of v at v = [u¯1 , . . ., u¯r]. Furthermore, maxG(v, ¯u, ¯x) = 0 at v = [u¯1 , . . .,
u¯r].
To untangle the notation, note that v is a curve of the strategy values. The
shape of the curve changes as u “seeks” its maximum. u are points on the
curve v that correspond to the populations x. As we shall see, v plays a role
in searching for the maximum of G.
2.3 Strategy dynamics
For the ith population of neurons, ui represents the population average value
of the phenotypes uij . With some further assumptions—that are irrelevant
here (but see Vincent et al., 1993)—we obtain
u′i = σ
∂G(v, u, x)
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=ui
, (3)
where σ controls the speed with which x and u get to the ESS, (¯x, ¯u),
from the initial values for the system defined in equations (1) and (3). The
notation in equation (3) implies that one first takes the derivative of G with
respect to v and then inserts the values of ui.
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Upon examination of equation (3), it becomes clear why we treat v as a
virtual variable. It serves as a place holder for the derivative of G after which
we replace its value with the current value of ui. Note that equation (3)
represents a gradient maximum seeking algorithm: at every instant of time,
u moves up the steepest slope that is determined by G(v, u, x). Equations
(1) and (3) with appropriate initial conditions define the dynamical smooth
evolutionary game. It is dynamical because the solution is obtained over
time; it is evolutionary because it refers to players (neurons) that exert
control on all other players (including themselves) to obtain fitness values. It
is a game because the control mechanism (u) drives each xi to its maximums
possible size simultaneously. Thus, the maximum that xi(t) can reach must
simultaneously depend on those maximums that all xj(t) reach with respect
to all ui. These maximums meet the definition of ESS. The road to ESS is
TESS.
2.4 Winners and losers
In the search for ESS, there are winners and losers. Winners are those
populations that remain positive at ESS. These are also the populations
that participate in TESS. Populations that may begin or enter the process
and then become zero constitute the losers. In this sense, in evolutionary
time, if two populations end up participating in the decision to move the
eyes to a target in the field of vision, and both populations participate in
achieving ESS, then both are winners. These will be the two populations
that participate in the TESS game.
3 Decision making with TESS
We shall use the above theory to make some qualitative predictions about
neuronal responses during decision making and examine the extent to which
these predictions agree with experimental results.
The search for ESS, and therefore TESS, proceeds as follows: We first con-
struct a mathematical model of the system. Some properties of the system
(as discussed below) determine how many populations with distinct firing
rates participate in the ESS. Next, we try a solution with a single popula-
tion. If we find a stable equilibrium that meets the conditions specified in
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the maximum principle above (i.e., u that maximizes G at G = 0), then we
have found ESS. The trajectories of x and u from some initial conditions
to ESS define TESS. If we do not find ESS, we try a solution with two
populations, and then three, and so on.
3.1 One-population ESS
Here we show the evolution of firing rates, and therefore decision making,
from two populations to one.
3.1.1 A mathematical model of the game
We modify the Lotka-Volterra competition model to construct the mathe-
matical model of system (1) and (3) (see Vincent and Brown, 2005). Suppose
that at t = 0, x1(0) and x2(0) start to coevolve according to the dynamics
x′1 (t) = rx1
(
1− α (u1, u1)x1 + α (u1, u2)x2
k (u1)
)
(4)
and
x′2 (t) = rx2
(
1− α (u2, u1)x1 + α (u2, u2)x2
k (u2)
)
. (5)
We will show that if coevolution dictates one population at ESS, then both
populations merge, in evolutionary time, into a single population. By def-
inition, a single population is comprised of those neurons that share the
same firing rate at ESS. Therefore, only one population at TESS is involved
with the neuronal decision mechanism. Consequently, a response may be
triggered by a threshold process (Hanes and Schall, 1996) or by achieving a
plateau (where H = 0).
The function k(ui) determines the population size at t, as a function of the
strategy value (firing rate), ui. When k is constant, it is usually called the
carrying capacity. The explicit form of k is
k (ui) := km exp
[
−1
2
(
ui
σk
)2]
. (6)
I was first proposed by Roughgarden (1983). Here km is a scalar; it is the
population size of xi when ui = 0. To avoid extra parameters in the system,
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we adjust the firing rate such that k(ui) is maximized when ui = 0. Often
a simple translation—moving ui to ui - u∗ where u∗ is the value at which
k(ui) is maximized—will do the job.
The value of σk determines the plasticity of deviation from the value of u
(= 0) that maximizes k(ui). When σk is small, a small deviation from ui =
0 results in a large decrease of xi at t. Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity of
10 0 10
0
50
100
v
k
Figure 1: k (u) with respect to the parameter values km,σk = 100, 10
(thick curve) and 50, 5 (thin curve).
k(ui) to changes in km and σk.
The role of σk in contributing to the potential maximum of xi permits in-
teresting predictions of the present theory: (i) In situations where quick
decisions, as opposed to accurate ones, are crucial to the fitness of the or-
ganism, σk will be large because small changes in ui cause small drop in
k(ui). (ii) When quick decisions are not crucial (so that, for example, accu-
racy plays an important role), then σk will be small. (iii) These conclusions
are predicated upon the assumption that small (or large) σk is associated
with some neurophysiological cost—otherwise, all σk will be rigid for deci-
sions that relate stimuli that require different responses (fast and inaccurate,
slow and accurate). If xi are spatially concentrated, then the theory pre-
dicts that large km should be associated with large local concentration of
populations.
If the parameters in equation (6) can be measured (an open question at this
time), then the theory predicts that, for example, the neurophysiological
response of prey to the detection of predators (flee) should be associated
with large σk—you better run away quickly even if you mistakingly thought
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that a predator was present. The response to say (usually ample) food de-
tection should be associated with small σk—you can take your time making
a decision, but you better not eat poisonous food.
Now α(ui, uj) in equations (4) and (5) is a function that translates the
values of ui and uj (the firing rate of populations i and j) to the magnitude
of inhibition that is exerted by xi on xj . For example, α(u1, u1) describes
self-inhibition. Note that α depends on both strategy values simultaneously.
The explicit form of α is
α (ui, uj) := 1 + exp
[
−1
2
(
ui − uj + b
σα
)2]
− exp
[
−1
2
(
b
σα
)2]
. (7)
It was proposed by Brown and Vincent (1987). To interpret the roles of the
parameters, note that the middle term in the right hand side of equation (7)
is at its maximum when ui = uj . This means that like inhibits like the most.
This is akin to the interpretation of competition in ecological communities—
individuals of the same species compete with each other more than with
individuals of another species. Because we do not expect the inhibitory
effect to be symmetric away from its maximum, we add the parameter b,
which scales the asymmetry. The last term in equation (7) ensures that the
maximum of α(ui, uj) is 1. Finally, the interpretation of σα is equivalent to
that of σk. Figure 2 illustrates the interactions among these parameters.
6 0 6
0.6
1.2
1.8
v
Α
Figure 2: α (v, 2) with b, σα set to 2, 2 (thick curve) and 4, 4 (thin curve).
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To write the strategy dynamics, define
G (v, u, x) := r − r
k (v)
2∑
i=1
α (v, ui) .
Note that upon replacing v with ui, the right hand side of equations (4) and
(5) are in fact G (ui, u, x) , i = 1, 2. Now we write the strategy dynamics as
u′1 (t) = σ
∂G (v, u, x)
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=u1
(8)
and
u′2 (t) = σ
∂G (v, u, x)
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=u2
. (9)
A solution of the system (4) to (9) with appropriate initial conditions solves
the game. In general, n can be larger than 2. For example, for n = 3 we
have six differential equations to solve, three for x and three for u.
3.1.2 A numerical example
We choose the following parameter values:
km = 100, σk = 1, b = 4, σα = 4, σ = 1, r = 0.25, (10)
x1 (0) = 20, x2 (0) = 20, u1 (0) = 1, u2 (0) = 2.
The numerical solution (Figure 3) indicates that x1 at the presumable ESS
is larger than x2. Consequently, a measurement of the total firing rate from
x1 will be higher than that from x2. Although x1 and x2 start from identical
initial conditions—which represent the background noise—their trajectories
separate because u1(0) = u2(0). If the neuronal steady state that both x and
u reach is ESS, then by our definition we have a single population because
their firing rates ui are equal. One can produce different trajectories of x1
and x2, but one will always get a single u, albeit with different roads to
ESS, depending on the initial conditions. Recall that the initial conditions
represent the background noise just before stimulus presentation at t = 0.
Our next task is to verify that the equilibrium shown in Figure 3 is in fact
an ESS. This can be accomplished by solving
∂G(v, u1, x)
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=u1
= 0
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Figure 3: Trajectories of two populations, x1 (thick curve) and x2 (thin
curve) and the corresponding strategies, u1 (thick curve) and
u2 (thin curve).
with respect to u1 and verifying (with second order derivatives) that the
solution is in fact a maximum G = 0 when v = u¯1 and x = ¯x.
An alternative ad hoc method is to numerically solve the system (1) and (3)
for a very large t to obtain ¯u = [u¯1 , u¯2] and ¯x = [x¯1 , x¯2] as t → ∞. If we
have a single strategy at ESS, then u¯1 = u¯2. Next, substitute these values
into G(v, u, x) and plot the resulting function. If its maximum is achieved
at (¯u, ¯x) and the value of this maximum is zero, then we have found ESS. To
illustrate this, we find from the long-time numerical solution of the system
defined by equations (4) to (9) with the parameter value in (10) that
¯x ≈ [75, 24] , ¯u ≈ [0.15, 0.15] .
and plot the results (Figure 4), verifying that the solution is a single popu-
lation at ESS.
Suppose that we can obtain numerical estimates of the parameters of system
(4) to (9). We then solve for ESS. If the solution dictates a single population
of firing neurons, then the theory predicts that the neuronal decision making
must be based on either a threshold or a plateau criterion. It cannot be based
on, for example, differences in firing rates from two populations of neurons.
Note that the road to ESS (what we call TESS), between (scaled) firing rate
values of 0 and 3 depends on the initial conditions. Now if we assume that
the variation of the background firing rate is small, then we have a good
reason to always start TESS from identical initial conditions.
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Figure 4: A numerical solution that illustrates one population of neurons
firing at the same rate (= 0.152) at ESS.
3.2 Two-population ESS
The results here illustrate the importance of σk in determining the number
of participating populations in the ESS solution, the differences in firing
rates between the two coexisting populations and the shape of TESS.
Suppose that we keep all parameter values as in (10), except for σk = 8
(to speed the approach to ESS, we also change σ = 4). The larger value
of σk implies that the decision needs to be fast, at the expense of errors;
the smaller value of σk implies that the decision must be accurate, at the
expense of speed. In such a case, we get coexistence of two populations at
ESS (Figure 5). We draw the reader’s attention to the qualitative similarity
0 100 300
35
t
x
0 100 300
0
6
12
t
u
Figure 5: A numerical solution that illustrates a two population ESS.
The right hand panel shows the firing rate (compare to Figure
3).
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between u (right panel of Figure 5) and the firing rates of neurons in the
frontal eye field (Schall and Hanes, 1993; Sato et al., 2001; Cohen et al.,
2009a), lateral intraparietal area (Thomas and Pare´, 2007), and superior
colliculus (McPeek and Keller, 2002) during visual search decisions when
the target of search is located inside the receptive field of the neuron (larger
firing rate) versus outside the receptive field (smaller firing rate). If the
two populations are located in different areas of the brain, then we get
two distinct centers in the brain that participate in the decision. Here,
the decision may be based on the difference between the firing rates u1
and u2. This decision principle has begun to be explored (Mazurek et al.,
2003; Purcell et al., 2008). One should not get too attached to the shape of
the TESS; many different shapes, that may fit experimental results, can be
produced based on fitting parameter values. The fundamental result is that
we end up with two distinguishable populations; and as Figure 5 illustrates,
even if the background firing rates (initial conditions) are close, the u will
diverge. Again, if the strategies are localized, then we identify two centers
in the brain that participate in a single decision.
For posterity, we show the ESS in Figure 6.
2 3 8
0.
0.03
0.06
v
G
,H
Figure 6: ESS of two populations. The points locate the firing rates of
the two populations at ESS. They are the maximum of G = 0.
The thick curves show H1 and H2 and illustrate the difference
between maximizing Hi (fitness) and the game theoretic solu-
tion according to the Maximum Principle (compare to Figure
4).
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3.3 Application to experimental results: strategies and de-
cisions
To illustrate the applicability of the theory, we fit TESS to data from Cohen
et al. (2009a). In this study, monkeys were trained to search for a target
stimulus among an array of distractor stimuli, and to indicate the location
of the target by moving their eyes to it. Single neurons in the frontal eye
field showed higher firing rate when the target was inside their receptive field
versus when a distractor stimulus was inside their receptive field. Thus, these
neurons showed activity correlating with the decision about the location of
the target. Figure 7 shows a qualitative fit to the data in (Figure 2A, Cohen
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Figure 7: Data (jagged curves) and fit for two-population game (smooth
curves). Data are from (Figure 2A, Cohen et al., 2009a) (firing
rates are scaled) and the parameter values are given in (11).
et al., 2009a) with the following parameter values:
r = 0.1, km = 200, σk = 8, b = 4, σα = 4, s = 6, (11)
x1 (0) = x2 (0) = 30, u1 (0) = 6.5, u2 (0) = 5.5
Apparently, two strategies, and therefore two populations of firing neurons,
are involved in visual search decision making. Cohen et al. (2009a) showed
that the decision about the location of a search target correlates with the
difference in the firing rates among these two populations.
A different population of neurons in the frontal eye field increases their
firing rate leading up to saccadic eye movements to a target in their move-
ment field, but fire at baseline during saccades outside their movement field.
Figure 8 shows a qualitative fit to one of these movement neurons using a
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Figure 8: Single strategy ESS and TESS. The upper jagged points shows
the scaled firing rate of a frontal eye field movement neuron
when a monkey made a saccade into its movement field in a
visual search array (Cohen et al., 2009b). The lower curve
shows the firing rate of that neuron when the monkey made a
saccade to a location opposite the movement field; the neuron
fired at its baseline rate under this condition. Therefore, we
have one strategy only. The smooth curve is the fit (by eye)
with the values shown in (12).
single-population ESS with the parameter values
r = 0.2, km = 100, σk = 3, b = 4, σα = 4, s = 1, (12)
x1 (0) = 30, u1 (0) = 6.5, u2 (0) = 0.5
The upshot is that frontal eye field neurons involved in discriminating the
search target from distractors may use two strategies, while those neurons
involved in preparing the eye movement may use one. These two types of
neurons—visual neurons, as shown in Figure 7, and movement neurons, as
shown in Figure 8—have been described as forming two stages of processing
during visual search decisions: target selection and movement preparation
(Schall, 2004). Note that a decision with one strategy requires exceedance
of a threshold (Hanes and Schall, 1996). Decision making with two strate-
gies may require a threshold of separation of firing rates between the two
populations (Purcell et al., 2008).
In experiments that involve visual search decisions, the difficulty of the task
can be manipulated by varying the number of distractors presented with
the target or the similarity between target and distractors (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Sato et al., 2001; Wolfe, 2007;
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Cohen et al., 2009a). Experiments using more difficult search tasks con-
firm that the decision to move the eye to the target takes longer (σk is
smaller). The theory predicts that the easier the visual search task (e.g.,
few distractors or low target-distractor similarity), the larger σk is and the
sooner the strategy trajectories of TESS bifurcate (which may lead to the
decision to move the eyes to the search target). When the search task is
difficult (e.g., many distractors or high target-distractor similarity), σk is
smaller. Figure 9 illustrates this principle and, qualitatively, experiments
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Figure 9: Solid curves show strategy bifurcation for σk = 8 compared to
σk = 12 (dotted curves). The remaining parameters are given
in equations (11). The bifurcation in strategy when σk = 8
occurs later than the bifurcation when σk = 12.
confirm the theoretical predictions. This prediction is not limited to visual
search decisions; indeed, the ubiquitous speed-accuracy trade off is not lim-
ited to mammals (e.g., Skorupski et al., 2006) or to visual decision making
(e.g., Rinberg et al., 2006). The ultimate agreement between experiments
and theory can be achieved only when (and if) σk can be measured (note
that σ2k is the variance of the population of decision-related neurons due to
changes in strategy values).
4 Discussion
A rich literature on the theory of the neural basis of decision making has
emerged recently (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Usher and McClelland, 2001;
Wang, 2002; Mazurek et al., 2003; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Smith and
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Ratcliff, 2004; Brown and Heathcote, 2005; Bogacz et al., 2006; Wong and
Wang, 2006; Beck et al., 2008; Doya, 2008; Ganguli et al., 2008; Smith and
Ratcliff, 2009). This theory has been grounded in the principle that sensory
evidence is accumulated in brain areas involved in decision making. Here,
we introduce a new approach to decision making theory in neuroscience:
dynamical evolutionary games, in which neurons are players.
Applications of game theory in neuroscience have dealt with decision making
of individuals (Barraclough et al., 2004; Sanfey, 2007; Lee, 2008), particu-
larly in social neuroscience. Recently, three reviews have called for applica-
tions of game theory from ecology (Glimcher, 2002; Glimcher and Rustichini,
2004; Schultz, 2004) to understand the neural mechanisms of decision mak-
ing. In this paper, we applied principles from dynamical evolutionary games
to well-studied decisions in the neurophysiology literature.
Neurophysiological studies have identified areas of the brain involved in vi-
sual decisions, particularly in prefrontal cortex (Schall and Hanes, 1993;
Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Sato et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2009a), parietal
cortex (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare´, 2007; Churchland
et al., 2008) and superior colliculus (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999; McPeek
and Keller, 2002). In these studies, single neuron firing was recorded and
correlated with decisions about a visual stimulus. In our dynamical evolu-
tionary game framework, we associate the firing rates of these neurons with
the population strategy, u. This population strategy corresponds to the fir-
ing rate of a single neuron upon repeated presentation of a visual stimulus
in these experiments. The theory is not restricted to visual decisions, but
we compare theory to experiment in this domain because it is one of the
best-understood and represents our research interest.
4.1 Interpreting parameters
As we have described above, u corresponds to the firing rate of individual
neurons in a population and x corresponds to the number of firing neurons
in that population. Here, we speculate about the relationship between other
components of the model and neurophysiological processes; clearly, experi-
ments must provide evidence for mappings between parameters in dynamical
evolutionary games and neurophysiological processes.
We showed that α(ui, uj) translates the values of ui and uj to the magnitude
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of inhibition exerted by xi on xj . Thus, α can be associated with several
factors that control inhibition, including neuromodulatory systems (Schultz
et al., 1997; Hasselmo and McGaughy, 2004; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005),
and with mechanisms of inhibition, including shunting inhibition (Mitchell
and Silver, 2003). The effects of inhibition have been observed in studies
that measured responses from multiple neurons simultaneously during de-
cisions (Constantinidis et al., 2002). Inhibition has also been proposed as
a mechanism for synchronizing neural activity (Van Vreeswijk et al., 1994;
Bush and Sejnowski, 1996), which may be important for decision making.
As described above, the parameter σk governs the speed and accuracy of
the decision. When σk is large, response time will be fast but there will be
errors. When σk is small, response time will be slow but decisions will be
accurate. We completely ignored the relation between σk and σα and how
their interactions may affect the number of populations that participate in
ESS. We also ignored interactions among other parameters. Yet, the direct
effect of σk on the size of the populations of firing neurons seems to be a
good starting point.
4.2 Limitations
There are several assumptions that we make using dynamical evolution-
ary games. Chief among them, is that the size of the populations of firing
neurons are large enough to justify a deterministic approach with smooth
functions. The theory as presented here is not appropriate for small pop-
ulations, where stochastic effects play a crucial role in the dynamics of the
system (see Cohen, 2009b).
As formulated, the theory emphasizes inhibition. A natural extension would
be to use predator-prey models with competition. In such systems, some
populations of firing neurons may be inhibitory (predators on prey) and
some excitatory (prey on predators). Other useful relationships that can be
borrowed from evolutionary game theory include host-parasite.
The concept of ESS does not imply that evolutionarily, populations of firing
neurons achieve it. It is a state toward which the system is moving.
An important extension of the theory would be with multiple strategies
(Brown et al., 2007). Such an extension does not require a major shift from
the theory discussed here. It does imply some complications in notation and
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computations.
Aside from the inability of smooth evolutionary game theory to deal with
small populations, there are additional limitations (or perhaps difficulties).
First, one has to come up with appropriate models—often a difficult task.
Second, one has to establish a link between the parameters of the mathe-
matical models and experimental measurements. Third, one has to come up
with an appropriate G-function; currently, there is no formal approach to
derive it.
4.3 Predictions
How well does the theory predict experimental results? We showed above a
qualitative fit of the dynamical evolutionary game strategy to firing rates of
frontal eye field neurons participating in visual search decisions. While not
the goal of this paper, quantitative fits are a matter of fitting parameters.
Now, consider equations (8) and (9), the strategy values. These two equa-
tions differ only in their initial conditions. Thus, a prediction of the model
is that firing rates of neurons participating in decisions will be governed
only by the parameters in the model. Future experiments should determine
which parameters are relevant for generating neuronal activity such as that
in Figure 7.
The evolutionary game makes predictions about the response time of a sub-
ject during easier versus harder decisions. A harder task may be associated
with closer initial conditions between u1 and u2, and therefore result in later
separation between those firing rates. This has been observed experimen-
tally (Sato et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2009a). A novel prediction of the theory
is that when the decision is harder, the population of neurons making the
decision is smaller (governed by k(u)). What controls the membership of a
neuron in a population is the solution of the game. We show that stronger
inhibition may be required for harder decision making.
Albeit not discussed in this manuscript, an intriguing possibility is that
cortical neurons do not fire randomly, as has been reported (e.g., Shadlen
and Newsome, 1998), but chaotically (Hansel and Sompolinsky, 1996). This
means that the firing rate (strategy) of populations of neurons is deter-
ministic and different results are obtained from different initial conditions.
Extensions of evolutionary game theory to chaotically firing neurons exist
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(Vincent and Brown, 2005), but much work remains to be done.
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